

Facilitation Support to DND's Chief of Force Development's JCPT Rehearsal 04 - 06 June 2014

John D. Graham
Senior Consultant, Advanced Solutions
CAE 1135 Innovation Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K2K 3G7
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CSA: Paul Massel, Team Leader, Strategic Planning Operations Research

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**FACILITATION SUPPORT TO DND'S
CHIEF OF FORCE DEVELOPMENT'S JCPT REHEARSAL
04 - 06 JUNE 2014**

FOR

**MR. PAUL MASSEL
DRDC CORA Sport Technical Lead**

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Primary Author

Original Signed by

23 Jun 2014

Name	John D Graham
Position	Senior Consultant, Advanced Solutions

Date

Reviewer

Original Signed by

23 Jun 2014

Name	Scott Guenther
Position	Solutions Development Leader

Date

Approval

Original Signed by

23 Jun 2014

Name	Jeremy Brooks
Position	Chief Engineer

Date

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1 INTRODUCTION

CAE Canada was contracted by the DRDC Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) to provide a senior resource with experience in military Force Development to facilitate a Joint Capability Planning Team (JCPT) rehearsal and provide suggestions for improvement on the process or tools to conduct the actual JCPT workshops currently scheduled between the fall of 2014 and the summer of 2015.

1.1 Background

This was the second rehearsal of the JCPT process, the first having been conducted in February over a 3 week period that covered all anticipated phases of work to define required capabilities for one (1) selected Defence Planning Scenario out of the full set of ten (10).

In preparation for the JCPT rehearsal, the facilitator attended a meeting with the JCPT Leader and members of the DRDC CORA Strategic Planning Operational Research Team (SPORT) who provided an overview of the results of the first rehearsal and a preview of the briefing to be provided to the second rehearsal participants.

1.2 Objective

The objective of the second rehearsal was to focus on processes and tools that had been modified as a result of feedback from the first rehearsal. As a result, no work was conducted on the Operational Planning Process to define the mission and only sufficient work in each of the subsequent steps was completed to test the new process or tool and not necessarily to completely fulfil the required data collection for a complete capability analysis.

The objective of CORA Task 172 was to engage an experienced resource to facilitate the conduct of the JCPT rehearsal and permit the JCPT Leader an increased freedom to observe and interact with the other participants as well as to ensure any perceived bias or conflict of interest related to the outcome would be avoided. The rehearsal involved approximately 10-15 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel from all three Services and civilian employees of DND, who are expected to be the primary candidates to participate in the actual JCPT.

To meet the CORA Task 172 objective the facilitator was called upon to:

1. Facilitate the JCPT rehearsal open discussions including the review of the process and its results and work to follow the agenda and rehearsal plan as defined and provided by the JCPT Leader; and
2. Work closely with the JCPT Leader during the assessment phases of the JCPT rehearsal in order to achieve the goals of the rehearsal.

1.3 This Document

This document fulfils the requirement to provide a brief summary report of observations on the overall conduct of the JCPT and recommendations.

2 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The JCPT rehearsal observations are organized into the following categories or phases:

1. facility;
2. participants;
3. in brief, including objectives, methodology, instructions and scenario;
4. processes and tools; and
5. interpretation and review of the results.

Within each category or phase any associated recommendations immediately follow the observation.

2.1 Facility

Observation 1

The facility provided for the JCPT rehearsal was in the basement of the north tower of NDHQ. It provided adequate room for all rehearsal participants to be seated at the conference table, invited subject matter experts, observers and support staff to be seated around the perimeter and sufficient room for the installation of the network of laptop computers used for data collection throughout the process. Audio / visual projection capabilities were adequate; however, with screens at either end of the room participants at the far end of the room had difficulty at times reading the smaller font on some slides. In addition, there was a large enclosed box at the far end of the room that produced a constant low level of noise that at times made discussion difficult.

Recommendation 1

While the facility was adequate for the rehearsal, there may be better venues for the full JCPT given the extended length required to complete the series of 10 defence planning scenarios anticipated. As an example, when the number of participants during the initial Ops Planning Process is significantly larger with the inclusion of subject matter expertise related to a particular scenario, it may be advantageous to use a somewhat larger facility to accommodate the larger number. When the numbers decrease for the remainder of the process, a smaller quieter facility may better facilitate discussion.

Recommendation 2

The JCPT Leader stated that the size of the Team would rise and fall during different phases of the analysis. It may be advantageous to book larger facilities for the Op Design phase when the group of participants is larger and then to shift to a smaller facility for the remainder of the analysis to facilitate discussion of points by the smaller group.

Observation 2

The use of the local area network to collect data was effectively used by the participants and the support team to provide timely input and processing for rapid turnaround of results. The ability to access the input software on the DWAN from participants' normal office space was well received and permitted some flexibility in the timing of the work and reach-back within the parent organization as required.

Recommendation 2

The use of this IM/IT solution should be continued throughout the entire process.

2.2 Participants

Observation 1

The selected scenario was that of Canada leading a deployed multinational Task Force of military and police forces to provide stabilization to a region following a natural disaster and to assist in the provision humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Given this scenario and the likelihood that the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and development (DFATD) would play a key role in the planning and execution of Canada's contribution to the effort, it is observed that no representative from that department was present.

Recommendation 1

There are a number of scenarios listed for analysis in which the Canadian Armed Forces will not be the lead agency. In order to assess the required capabilities and the measures of capabilities to support "whole-of-government" initiatives accurately, it is highly recommended to seek appropriate representation from other departments and agencies that would play a role in the mission for at least the Ops Design phase to determine their potential contributions and/or requirements.

Observation 2

The participation of all three Services, as well as the Special Operations Force and the Joint Logistics community, provided the breadth of knowledge and experience essential to the Joint Capability Planning process. It was noted by the JCPT Leader that the intent was to include other "specialist" classifications such as legal, medical, public affairs as well as engineering, infrastructure and environment and information management for the actual JCPT during the Ops Design phase and then to maintain an as and when required "reach-back" to the same resources throughout each analysis.

Recommendation 2

The request for the inclusion of additional subject matter expert resources during the Op Design phase should be supported and forwarded to the various L1s. In addition, some consideration should be given to have current Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) planners and or

members of the Lessons Learned section in attendance to provide insights on the current restraints and constraints, and lessons learned from actual similar deployments and what capabilities should have been available in an ideal situation.

Observation 3

While many participants were familiar with the objectives, processes and tools from earlier participation in the February rehearsal, others were not. In addition, changes to the process and tools were not fully explained, which at times caused some confusion and misapplication that required correction or could have resulted in skewed results.

Recommendation 3

At the start of each session, offer a brief half-day orientation and training session to new participants and specific subject matter experts required for specific scenarios, on the objectives, the processes and tools they will be required to use and how to interpret the intermediate results.

Observation 4

The JCPT Leader indicated that the use of an outside facilitator permitted him greater freedom to focus on and interpret the inputs provided by the participants and to determine minor course correction in real-time.

Recommendation 4

The use of an outside facilitator should be continued. Like the other participants, consistency in the use of the same facilitator for all scenarios would be helpful.

Observation 5

In this first use of a facilitator, by not having participated in the first rehearsal, the learning curve was very steep; however, it also provided an insight into training and preparation issues for the effort.

Recommendation 5

If the decision to use a facilitator of the series of JCPT analyses is supported, it would be beneficial to maintain the same facilitator throughout the process to reduce the need to provide repetitive training on the objectives, processes and tools as well as provide consistency and familiarity with the established group.

2.3 In Brief

The in brief was developed assuming that all the same participants would be involved in this rehearsal that had previous experience in the February event. As a result, it provided an overview of the outputs of the previous rehearsal that would be reused for this event as a

baseline such as the scenario and Op Design. The following minor observations are provided based on the briefed output and not on the process used to produce the content of the brief.

Observation 1

The assumption was made that most participants had been involved in the first rehearsal which held true. However, there was no immediate recognition of the group's prior work and the impact it had on the proposed changes to the process and tools.

Recommendation 1

Explicitly recognize the prior work in this area and the process of constant improvement that they will be asked to feed. Acknowledge the efforts of the previous group and the improvements that have been incorporated as a result. Then provide a brief description of the changes that have been made, i.e. the change to the measure of capability framework, how it should be used and the improvement it will provide to the results. This should not take an excessive amount of time but may elicit greater engagement from the group and avoid potential difficulties downrange due to unrecognized or misunderstood changes to the process.

Observation 2

The group at times reverted to current capabilities when there was a stated desire to have them consider capabilities that may be available in the 10 to 15 year timeframe.

Recommendation 2

As discussed in the "hot wash" there may be an advantage to providing a short insight into the future security environment as well as the advances in capabilities over the past decade and extrapolate those trends over the next decade. This may assist in establishing the desired forward looking mindset.

Observation 3

While attention to detail and critical thinking are essential to the JCPT process, there were minor errors in the wording of the content of the in brief that were distracting to some members of the group. An example is the assertion that this would be a UN Chapter VII authorized mission. While the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) mission after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti was conducted as such, it was because the Chapter VII mission was ongoing after the 2004 fall of the Government and not as a result of the earthquake. Although this is a minor point, it can detract to the overall effect particularly of other government departments or agencies are in attendance.

Recommendation 3

Conduct a thorough scrub of the proposed scenarios validating assumptions gained from past experience. Ideally, interdepartmental input and vetting of the scenarios and their inherent assumptions could be assisted by requesting assistance from the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat within the Privy Council Office for scenarios 3, 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D and 6 and the

Security and Intelligence Secretariat for scenarios 1A, 1B, 2, 3 and 4. This would highlight the acknowledgement by National Defence of the Government's desire to conduct future operations within a "whole-of-government" framework and seek a means to proactively establish a common agreed set of possible general scenarios for planning purposes.

2.4 The Processes

The general process currently in place is to:

1. flesh out the specific defence planning scenario and produce a Op Design including Decisive Points (DPs) along the various Lines of Operations (LOOs);
2. to achieve the DP identify required capabilities;
3. for each identified capability assign an appropriate Measure of Capability (MoC) using the provided framework; and
4. for each capability identify appropriate Force Elements (Fes) that could provide the capability given the MoC and the scenario.

Observation 1

In this scenario, there appeared to be little recognition of the Government's stated objective to conduct "whole-of-government" missions and that in this particular case, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, it would likely be DFATD who would be the lead federal department for the mission.

Recommendation 1

Identify within each scenario the other federal departments and agencies that would likely be involved in the Government's intervention as well as which will be likely the lead department and the supporting departments. This conscious acknowledgement may have a significant impact, particularly on the C4 aspects, as well as an impact on the possible types and measures of required capabilities to support other departments and agencies assigned to respond by the Government.

Observation 2

While the Op Design was not conducted for this rehearsal, it was agreed by the participants that a one week period would be dedicated to this task for each of the ten (10) scenarios to be analysed.

Recommendation 2

In light of the list of proposed scenarios, it is likely that the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), as the CAF's Force Employer, would have straw-man Standing Contingency Ops Plans already developed for each general scenario. Rather than starting from scratch, it may be advantageous to use these documents as a start point for discussion and development of the

specific Op Design for the following reasons. They are “authoritative” in nature and provide a current listing of anticipated tasks within any given general scenario i.e. peace support, peace enforcement, warfare or war fighting. They may provide an insight into current constraints and restraints of available capabilities. They provide a clear link to the current “as is” state of available capabilities and anticipated task force structure for any given scenario and, as such, could serve as a baseline model from which to project 10 to 15 years out. They are updated based upon experience and lessons learned that may have identified areas where new or enhanced capabilities would have been beneficial.

Observation 3

The capability list as provided was based on the broad functional categories of Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain as Tier 1 “capabilities”; groups of activities as Tier 2; activities as Tier 3 and tasks as Tier 4. All require capabilities at different levels of aggregation; however, for the task as hand for Directorate of Capability Integration (DCI), it is suggested that focus should be at the systems level that support identified tasks because as the name implies, the Directorate is interested in the integration of systems provided by Force Elements into a system-of-systems to provide required capability at each aggregate level and thereby ensure the CAF can provide the effects to meet Government objectives.

Recommendation 3

If the software permits, it is recommended that an ability to identify and select tier 4 capabilities be provided throughout the analysis to permit identification of specific systems that could provide the capability for integration.

Observation 4

In this second rehearsal, there was a decision to indicate how long a Decisive Point (DP) would be required, i.e. C2 established. In hindsight, this may distort the concept of a DP which would normally be considered, as the name implies, a point in time, in the example above, either Initial Operating Capability (IOC) or Full Operating Capability (FOC) levels of performance. This also blends two different phases of the process, identification of the decision point which can be interpreted as the time a capability or set of capabilities are first required and the measure of capability which is farther downstream.

Recommendation 4

Keep the concepts and terminology as familiar as possible and in the Op Design phase of the process identify DPs as IOC and FOC of capabilities or sets of capabilities as required. Do not address any specific measure of capability, i.e. persistence, until the full set of measures are considered.

Observation 5

In reviewing the DPs across LOOs, it would appear that there may be some “standard” DPs that could be reused with minor modifications across multiple scenarios i.e. C2 established. In no

case will there not be a requirement for C2 and so the differences will reside in the required measures of performance and not in the establishment of C2 itself.

Recommendation 5

For standard DPs, develop easy to use drop down menus to validate the requirements and use them to speed the initial development of the Op Design phase.

Observation 6

At times, there was considerable discussion on where the communications and information system (CIS) responsibilities were within the capability framework.

Recommendation 6

In keeping with recommendation 3, to keep concepts familiar where possible, divide the functional categories into two groups, Command and Sense as one and Act, Shield and Sustain as the other. The first group, Command and Sense require what is commonly referred to and reasonably well understood as C4ISR which can be decomposed to C2 (front end command and control) + C2 (back end communications and computers) + I (intelligence that fills in hard information gaps) + SR (surveillance and reconnaissance to collect information). C4ISR could be considered the supporting capabilities that enable the CAF to effectively conduct the supported activities demanded by the Government of Act, Shield and Sustain. This explicit linkage to something familiar may make the identification of required capabilities less difficult.

2.5 Tools

The tools provided the participants were the capability list, the measure of capability framework and the force element list as well as the various electronic documents used to input data. Additional analytic software tools were used by the CORA support personnel.

Observation 1

While the tools appeared to be more than adequate for their intended purpose, at times they were not used as intended and as a result skewed some initial results.

Recommendation 1

For early analyses, it may be beneficial to provide some instruction on the use of the tools including examples. This could avoid skewed results from input errors due to misuse of the tools.

Observation 2

The tool for measure of capability did not include a C2 measure for Joint, Interagency and Multinational (JIM) operations.

Recommendation 2

The C2 scale should be modified to recognize the JIM construct as the Government's publically stated preferred method for intervention and would likely represent the highest level of required capability.

Observation 3

The tool for measure of capability related to Scale (sustain) provided no indication of the ranges used to measure large, medium or small Task Forces.

Recommendation 3

Provide broad ranges for this particular scale in order to be provide consistent results from participants.

Observation 4

Within the Force Element tool, ADM (Pol) is listed as National Level Support – Command.

Recommendation 4

Modify the tool to more accurately indicate that members of the Department cannot exercise "Command" or provide "military advice" but rather provide "defence policy advice" to the Minister through the Deputy Minister.

2.6 Review and Interpretation of the Results

Observation 1

A comment was made during the closing day of the rehearsal that during the review of the results, if the consensus was they did not reflect the view of the participants, then the results generated from the collected data would be discarded and the results overwritten to reflect the common view.

Recommendation 1

If what appears to be an unanticipated result occurs, rather than discard and overwrite it, in order to maintain the integrity of the scientific methodology of the analysis it is imperative to review the data and determine if there were incorrect assumptions or input errors and correct them as opposed to abandoning the results. This will be particularly important if the results will be used to justify future capability investments and the analytic methodology is verified by parties outside National Defence.

Observation 2

At times the results were displayed without a clear linkage as to the subject area being displayed. The SPORT Team indicated that minor changes could be made to ensure the subject under consideration was always clearly displayed along with the results.

Recommendation 2

Recommend this change be actioned prior to the first fall session.

3 SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS AND CONCLUSION

3.1 Summary of main points

1. The JCPT participants during this last rehearsal appeared well motivated and suited to the task and with further augmentation by specialist subject matter experts as planned, the results will be significantly enhanced. A key aspect will be to continually link to the current mission set while reminding and insisting participants project forward 10 to 15 years and anticipate the evolution of defence capabilities that will likely be required to support and conduct operations and available for prioritized investment.
2. A key to good results will be the ability of the participants to understand the context of the work particularly the importance it has in providing defensible arguments for future defence capability investments. They should be given instruction to ensure they understand and can correctly and effectively apply the processes and tools provided to them to ensure valid results.
3. The use of an outside facilitator was reported to have permitted the JCPT Leader the opportunity to focus more on the interactions of the participants and to interpret their inputs real-time. The continued use of a consistent facilitator would likely assist JCPT Leader in the conduct of the series of analyses as well as providing an outside perspective and interpretation of the results.

3.2 Conclusion

The processes and tools currently in place are sufficient to effectively conduct the analysis as planned; however, there are areas that could be improved to permit analysis in a timelier manner and with more defensible results as described in the previous section.